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Abstract 
In the last 20 years, the U.S. equity markets structure has been changing 
drastically. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), driven by numerous 
studies regarding market competition and economic efficiency, recognizing these 
two variables as having a positive correlation (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Porter, 
1990),  started to implement policies against market dominance. On August 29th, 
2005, the Regulation National Markets System (Reg NMS) was released to 
harmonize regulation for equity trading services within the U.S., increasing 
competition and consumer protection in the trading industry services. 
Using panel data regarding order execution from September 2016 to December 
2016. This research attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of Reg NMS regarding 
trading venues competition using a multinomial logit demand model for 
differentiated products with dummy variables to capture a non-observable 
variable. The results suggest that, even though, implicit trading costs, are 
essential to estimate the trading demand still exists market dominance in the U.S. 
trading venues, resulting in unusually inelastic price elasticities. 
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Introduction 
In the last 20 years, the U.S. equity markets structure has been changing 
drastically. After the electronic trading boom in the 1990s and the Order 
Handling Rules of 1997, competition has augmented considerably, giving rise to 
new ways of trading and many other independent trading venues. In 2002, 
however, a trend to consolidation emerged. Started with the merger of 
Archipelago and REDIBook (at the time owned by Goldman Sachs), and the 
subsequent merger of Instinet and Island, giving rise to INET (the major 
electronic communications networks), NASDAQ motivated by its loss in market 
share decided to acquire BRUT. This trend reached its top in 2005, by the 
acquisition of ArcaEx by NYSE, and the merge between NASDAQ and INET, 
giving rise to a duopoly (Lee & Tierney, 2013). 
At that point, driven by numerous studies regarding market competition and 
economic efficiency, recognizing these two variables as having a positive 
correlation (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Porter, 1990), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), started to implement policies against market dominance. In 
this context, in August 29th, 2005, the Regulation National Markets System (Reg 
NMS) was released to harmonize regulation for equity trading services within 
the U.S., increasing competition and consumer protection in the trading industry 
services. 
This regulation included new fundamental instructions that were considered 
to update and reinforce the regulatory environment for U.S. equity markets. The 
main points of this regulation were, firstly, the Order Protection Rule, requiring 
to financial intermediaries to enforce policies and processes to execute  
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orders at the best possible price available on the markets. Secondly, the Access 
Rule, requiring executions to be fair and non-discriminatory when it comes to 
quotations, by limiting the fees charged by trading venues and financial 
intermediaries, hence, harmonizing access fees across investors. Thirdly, the Sub-
Penny Rule, i.e., financial intermediaries are prohibited from ranking, accepting 
or display orders in price increments minor than a penny, except for stocks priced 
at values below than $1.00 per share. Moreover, finally, Securities and Exchange 
Commission reformulate the Market Data Rules, requiring all trading venues to 
provide information regarding order execution (Rule 605 – formerly, Rule 11Ac1-
5) and order routing information (Rule 606 – formerly, Rule 11Ac1-6) (Davies & 
Sirri, 2017). 
 In this study, we pretended to evaluate the effectiveness of this regulation 
regarding implicit trading costs, by estimating the demand for the trading venues 
acting in the U.S. and analyzing its variables price elasticities. These type of cost, 
such as the bid-ask spread or the market impact are referred typically in the 
literature as the price paid for liquidity (Keim & Madhavan, 1998). 
After estimating the demand for the trading venues in the U.S. and analyzing 
its variables price elasticities (in our model we only considered implicit trading 
costs due to lack of data), from September 2016 to December 2016. Our findings 
suggests that, even though, implicit trading costs, are essential to estimate the 
trading demand still exists market dominance in the U.S. trading venues, 
resulting in unusually inelastic price elasticities.  
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This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the U.S. 
equity markets, providing some clarification concerning regulation, order 
execution process and trading agents in the U.S. Chapter 2 presents the literature 
review regarding trading costs and demand models. Chapter 3 provides the 
theoretical model and methodology used to estimate the demand for trading 
venues. Chapter 4 brieﬂy describe the data and present the results. Finally, 
Chapter 5 concludes with the main finding and its implications.  
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Chapter 1 
U.S. Equity trading 
1. U.S. Equity trading – An Overview 
Equity trading markets are crucial in the modern economy. These markets 
connect individuals with excess capital with companies and corporations that 
can use their capital in more productive ways, allocating capital to 
revolutionizing projects. For example, recently we have seen technology 
companies going public such as Twitter, Inc. (NYSE: TWTE), and Facebook Inc. 
(NASDAQ: FB). As investors recognize that these companies create a new 
possibility to invest in innovating and productive projects, allocating capital to 
businesses efficiently, we have seen a rise in the stock price ever since. 
This efficiency can be hurt, however. With a few trading venues, i.e., a 
concentrated market, whereas a small number of firms have a significant 
percentage of the total market share, the companies providing the service have 
the incentive to increase their profits by increasing customers’ costs.  
In that case, investors would save their money instead of investing it, because, 
with high trading costs, the probability of the investment to turn on a profit one 
decreases. Since, at first they would need to beat the costs of trading and, only 
then, if the stock went up enough to surpass the initial price plus trading costs, 
the investor would have a profit from the investment. Later, we will see that costs 
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of trading do not exclusively mean the price paid for the stock such as fees to 
trade, but also other costs. 
In this chapter, we analyze the equity markets structure and regulation 
evolution in the U.S., the economics of trading, and finally, provide some data 
regarding the agents currently acting on the equity markets. 
1.1 Market Structure and Regulation Evolution 
In the last 20 years, the equity markets structure has been changing drastically. 
After the electronic trading boom in the 1990s and the Order Handling Rules of 
1997, competition has augmented considerably, giving rise to new ways of 
trading and many other independent trading venues. These include alternative 
trading systems, exchanges not regulated as the other public exchanges; 
electronic communications networks, i.e., a subset of alternative trading systems 
used to match orders privately and automatically, and dark pools, which are 
mainly private over-the-counter exchanges, typically not available to typical 
investors. 
In 2002, though, a trend to consolidation emerged. Started with the merger of 
Archipelago and REDIBook (at the time owned by Goldman Sachs), and the 
subsequent merger of Instinet and Island, giving rise to INET (the major 
electronic communications networks), NASDAQ motivated by its loss in market 
share decided to acquire BRUT. This trend reached its top in 2005, by the 
acquisition of ArcaEx by NYSE, and the merge between NASDAQ and INET, 
giving rise to a duopoly (Lee & Tierney, 2013). 
However, driven by numerous studies regarding market competition and 
economic efficiency, recognizing these two variables as having a positive 
correlation (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Porter, 1990), the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), started to implement policies against market dominance.  
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In this context, on August 29th, 2005, the Regulation National Markets System 
(SEC, 2005) was released to harmonize regulation for equity trading services 
within the U.S., increasing competition and consumer protection in the trading 
industry services. 
This regulation included new fundamental instructions that were considered 
to update and reinforce the regulatory environment for U.S. equity markets. The 
main points of this regulation were, firstly, the Order Protection Rule, requiring 
to financial intermediaries to enforce policies and processes to execute orders at 
the best possible price available on the markets. Secondly, the Access Rule, 
requiring executions to be fair and non-discriminatory when it comes to 
quotations, by limiting the fees charged by trading venues and financial 
intermediaries, hence, harmonizing access fees across investors. Thirdly, the Sub-
Penny Rule, i.e., financial intermediaries are prohibited from ranking, accepting 
or display orders in price increments minor than a penny, except for stocks priced 
at values below than $1.00 per share. Moreover, finally, Securities and Exchange 
Commission reformulate the Market Data Rules, requiring all trading venues to 
provide information regarding order execution (Rule 605 – formerly, Rule 11Ac1-
5) and order routing information (Rule 606 – formerly, Rule 11Ac1-6) (Davies & 
Sirri, 2017).  
Therefore, after a period of increase in competition (between the 1990s to 
2002), and a period of consolidation (between 2002 and 2005), the U.S. trading 
markets were back on track. After the implementation of the Reg NMS, helped 
by information technologies as we have seen before, the number of trading 
venues amplified, increasing the competition between trading venues. 
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Figure 1 – Market Share Volume (Daily Avg., Mils. of Shares) 
 
Source: Bats Global Markets 
 
From the figure above, by examining the market share regarding daily average 
volume, we can verify that between 2009 and 2016 there was a decrease in the 
market share as a whole, most likely because of the most recent financial crisis 
(2007/2008). Further, we can observe that during this period, NYSE and 
NASDAQ had the most substantial decrease in market share. On the contrary, 
Direct EDGE had the most significant increase, reaching a stable market share 
since 2011. At the time, Bats has almost remained the same between 2009 and 
2016. For last, we have the off-exchange market share, which since 2012 recovered 
its market power. By using only this figure, it would be hard to conclude 
anything, but we can attest that since 2008, the most significant exchanges (NYSE 
and NASDAQ), lost some market share to other exchanges.  
1.2 Understanding Order Execution 
Before analyzing the existing equity trading agents currently acting in U.S. 
equity markets, we need to understand how trades occur. Many studies review 
this process, so our effort in this subchapter is to give the fundamentals of this 
process without going too thick. 
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The trading process starts with a buyer or a seller trying to exchange its money 
for a stock, or vice-versa. Today, we can quickly start an account in an online 
trading platform, and send orders to the market without even thinking about the 
process behind the scene. 
This process has been through some changes in the last few years, as a result 
of the internet boom (Choi, Laibson, & Metrick, 2002), and increasing regulation 
regarding market power, originating new financial intermediaries (Lee & 
Tierney, 2013), but essentials have remained the same. 
Firstly, after an investor sends an order to buy or sell a stock on the market, 
the financial intermediary that receives the order – financial intermediary 
represents any entity that acts between parties, in this case between investors and 
trading venues – it will have to choose between different ways to fulfill the order. 
At this point, bear in mind the topic on regulation, regarding Order Protection 
Rule, which states that the financial intermediary has to choose the one that gives 
the investor the best price available in the market.  
This best market price available can be relative, however. To choose to each 
trading venue to route the order, the financial intermediary has to choose the one 
that gives the best price having in consideration all costs that the investor can 
incur in a trade. These costs include explicit trading costs, for example, the fee 
paid to execute an order, and implicit trading cost, for instance, the opportunity 
costs regarding execute an order at time 𝑡, when compared to execute the same 
order at time 𝑡 + 1. We will discuss this subject later. 
At this point, the financial intermediary has to choose between different 
options. First, it can attempt to fulfill the order on the trading floor, for instance, 
can send the order to be executed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or 
any other stock exchange. In the U.S. some exchanges with the intention of 
having the privilege to execute financial intermediary’s trades pay a fee to the 
financial intermediary, known as payment of order flow.  
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Second, can place the order to a third market maker, this can occur in the U.S. 
by two reasons, the third market maker is giving an incentive to the financial 
intermediary lowering the cost or the financial intermediary may not can trade 
directly in that exchange. Financial intermediaries are required to be exchange 
members to trade securities in that exchanges directly. 
Third, can internalize the order, matching buy-side orders with sell-side 
orders of investors within its portfolio, and since it would have to trade in any 
trading venue, can make some extra money on the charged spread. 
Fourth, can use electronic communications network, matching buy and sell 
orders automatically, this case is usually used to limit order since this platforms 
can match these type of trades very quickly. And lastly, commonly used 
nowadays, can send the order to be executed over-the-counter by a market maker 
responsible for the security such as the NASDAQ.  
Even though, the last option can be great for some institutional investors, 
investors that have the power to trade directly with these market makers. In some 
other cases, since these are less transparent markets, can lead to a moral hazard 
problem because trades can be routed to a market maker, just because is the one 
that pays the most significant fee to the financial intermediary – payment of order 
flow. Not giving the investor the best possible price available in the market, and 
making it the most unreliable orders in the investor perspective as the financial 
intermediary has the incentive to may not always send investor’s order to the 
best possible available price.  
In the last stage, after the financial intermediary has chosen the option and 
sent the order to be executed, receives the details about the order execution and 
the custodian. A custodian is a financial institution that will safekeeping the 
securities to mitigate the risks related to theft or loss, charging a predetermined 
amount, which has to be in consideration when determining explicit trading 
costs. Figure 2 on the next page provides us a quick overview of this process. 
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Figure 2 – Understanding Order execution 
 
1.3 Equity Trading Agents 
In the previous subchapter, we saw that equity trading could occur on any of 
the public exchanges, Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs), Electronic 
Communication Networks (ECNs), or at off-exchange financial intermediaries, 
including internalization.  
In respect of financial intermediaries, FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory organization in charge of supervising 
financial intermediaries, over-the-counter markets, and some stock exchanges. 
Reported that as of December 2016, there was 3,835 registered ATSs, ECNs, or at 
off-exchange financial intermediaries firms, resulting in a decrease of 1,056 firms 
since 2008 (see Table 1). 
Table 1 – FINRA Registered Financial Intermediaries 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 
Firms 
4,891 4,718 4,578 4,457 4,29 4,146 4,068 3,943 3,835 
Source: https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics 
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Figure 3 – Market Share (%) as of December 2016 
 
Source: Bats Global Markets 
 
Figure 3 shows us the market share (%), as of December 2016. We can perceive 
that most of the trading occurred in ATSs, ECNs, or at off-exchange financial 
intermediaries registered at FINRA, totalizing 36% of the trading, followed by 
NYSE and NASDAQ with 14% of market share for each, and NYSE Arca with 
11%. Moreover, the remaining 25% of the market share, is distributed by all the 
others (IEX, CHX, NSX, EDGX Equities, BZX Equities, BYX Equities, NASDAQ 
BX, EDGA Equities, NASDAQ PSX, and NYSE American). 
Moreover, Deutsche Bank reports that the share of high-frequency trading –  
automated trading programs using sophisticated algorithms to examine 
variables and markets, executing orders automatically reducing the execution 
time, hence, less implicit costs – accounts for approximately 40% of market 
volume in 2014 (Kaya, 2016). To a better understanding of the dramatic changes 
during recent years, as a result of increases in automation and entrance of new 
trading platforms see (Angel, Harris, & Spatt, 2011). 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
2. Theoretical Framework 
From the previous chapter we could understand that since the implementation 
of Reg NMS, and its Order Protection Rule, financial intermediaries, must best 
execute investors orders. Meaning that, if an investor wants to execute an order, 
the financial intermediary to comply with the law needs to route the order to the 
trading venue that minimizes investor costs. 
This definition can be dubious, however. Financial intermediaries will have to 
take in consideration not only the fees and other cash payable costs that will be 
charged by the trading venue – explicit trading costs – but also, other intrinsic 
costs such us order execution time – implicit trading costs. 
Furthermore, to study the competition between trading venues will be 
required to apply a unique trading demand model, as this model will need to 
capture and represent all the complexity of the trading execution process.  
In this chapter we present a résumé of our main finding regarding the 
literature review, starting by examining the literature concerning trading costs, 
followed by the literature in-demand models. 
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2.1 Trading Costs Components 
To accurately understand trading costs is essential to estimate the best possible 
order execution when dealing with to each trading venue to route investors 
order. This subchapter will present detail on this costs, as well as, give some 
insights about why the costs are so substantial when routing an order. 
The literature typically splits these costs into two: explicit and implicit trading 
costs. The explicit trading costs related to all direct cash expenses that financial 
intermediaries can incur, such as the market fees. And the implicit trading costs 
related to the liquidity of a trading venue, such as the bid-ask spread (Brogaard, 
Hendershott, Hunt, & Ysusi, 2014; D’Hondt & Giraud, 2008; Keim & Madhavan, 
1998; Ribeiro, 2010).  
Moreover, these two costs are vitally connected to competition within 
financial markets by two main reasons. First, by increasing the competition, 
trading venues will have to lower their trading fees to be competitive, reducing 
its explicit costs. Second, the number of shares per trading venue in a competitive 
market is lower, diminishing the liquidity for each of them, hence, increasing the 
implicit costs of trading, e.g., larger bid-ask spreads, superior market impacts, 
and so forth (Bennett & Wei, 2006; Ribeiro, 2010). The next table presents the 
principal explicit and implicit trading costs that financial intermediaries have to 
consider regarding order execution.  
 Table 2 – Typology of Investors’ Trading Costs 
  
Explicit Costs Implicit Costs 
Brokerage Commissions Bid-Ask Spread 
Market Fees Market Impact 
Clearing and Settlement Costs Operational Opportunity Costs 
Taxes/Stamp Duties Market Timing Opportunity Costs 
  Missed Trade Opportunity Costs 
Source: (D’Hondt & Giraud, 2008) 
 
  27 
Even though, explicit trading costs are fundamental to estimate the execution 
costs we will not examine these costs deeply, since, to our research, we will apply 
a demand model regarding implicit trading costs. We only give a quick scope 
about each of these costs, followed by a comprehensive analysis of implicit 
trading costs. 
2.1.1 Explicit Trading Costs 
As from the last table explicit trading costs are related to all direct cash 
expenses, and can be divided into four central cash payments: 
1. Brokerage commissions, the commissions paid to intermediaries for 
executing trades. Although this is a commission paid by investors to 
the financial intermediary, does not mean that the financial 
intermediary does not have to take this expense in consideration when 
trying to execute investors order at the best possible order execution. 
These costs vary from one intermediary to another, but they are a fixed 
and observable cost.  
2. Market fees, the amount paid to exchanges for fulfilling orders. These 
fees are typically embedded into brokerage commissions and can vary 
from one trading venue to another, yet, higher volume markets usually 
have the lowest costs. As a result of competition, during the last years, 
it was observed a significant decrease in these costs (Gomber, Sagade, 
Theissen, Westheide, & Weber, 2017). Market fees are considered a 
fixed and observable cost. 
3. Clearing and settlement costs are the amounts paid to transfer security 
rights permanently from one investor to another. These costs vary from 
one trading venue to another, and may occur in a different party than 
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the one that the financial intermediary executed the order, yet, are 
considered fixed and observable costs.  
4. Taxes/stamp duties are observable, but variable trading costs. They are 
observable as tax rates, or particular stamp duties known in advance 
but variable for the reason that they frequently differ by type of trade. 
2.1.2 Implicit Trading Costs 
In other words, implicit trading costs are characterized by its non-tangibility, 
representing the indirect costs such as the impact on the price occurred by 
trading some security, or the opportunity cost of not trading at some point in 
time, for instance, imagine the investor sent an order to the financial intermediary 
in period 𝑡1 went the stock was priced at $99, but could only be fulfilled in period 
𝑡2 when the price was already at $100, this represents a potential loss in value of 
$1.  
In the extreme case, imagine that the financial intermediary could not fulfill 
the order at all. As a result, the investor had no explicit gains or losses. What 
these implicit costs tell us, though, is that actually, the investor had a potential 
gain or loss. If the order had been executed, the investor would have had a gain 
or loss - excluding the case that stock remains in the same price, having no losses 
or gain. However, even in this case could be argued that depending on the order 
size the market impact of this order could lead to changes in stock price, affecting 
the stock price upwards or downwards. 
As we could understand from the previous example, these kinds of costs can 
be hard to estimate, and bring to the scientific community a whole new basket of 
question about how to best estimate these costs. Next, we presented the most 
used and accepted implicit trading costs measurements. 
 
  29 
2.1.2.1 Quoted Bid-ask Spreads 
Considered as the market maker’s return for providing liquidity. Represents 
the gap between the average price that investors are willing to pay and the 
average price that other investors are willing to sell a particular stock, resulting 
in more extensive spread lengths as liquidity decreases, early literature used this 
measure as a standard measure of implicit costs. Studies found that quoted 
spread in large market capitalization stocks (liquid stocks), when compared to 
small market capitalization stocks (illiquid stocks), can vary widely from 0.5% to 
4-6%, respectively (Huang & Stoll, 1996).  
Even though, this liquidity measure seems to be reliable, in fact, can result in 
incredibly inaccurate transaction costs and liquidity estimates. With a propensity 
to increase/decrease its length as a buy/sell trade occur, round turn transaction 
costs (all costs incurred in an order execution), might be less than quoted spreads 
suggests. Moreover, nowadays, trades can occur at prices outside the quoted bid 
or ask prices. For example, when a trade takes place over-the-counter, whereas a 
trade can occur at any price settled between two parties, this transaction will not 
be reflected on the quoted bid-ask spread (Keim & Madhavan, 1998). 
2.1.2.2 Effective Bid-ask Spreads 
To mitigate the issues regarding the quoted spreads, numerous authors have 
suggested measures. The effective bid-ask spread, however, firstly proposed by 
Roll (1984), and extended by George, Kaul, & Nimalendran (1991), and others, 
was the one that prevails. Being the most commonly used these days - even Reg 
NMS when it comes to disclosure of order execution information (Rule 605), 
require the market participants to disclose this measure. 
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Where we present its simpler version: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑦−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡) ∗ 2 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡) ∗ 2 
 
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 denotes the quoted bid-ask spread midpoint in period 𝑡, and 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 the actual price at which the order was fulfilled in period 𝑡. 
2.1.2.3 Market Impact 
While the first two measures present us qualitative and quantitative measures 
for liquidity, neither of them compute possible trade price impacts for high 
volume trades.  
When dealing with large orders, we have two effects that can occur and that 
will impact trade prices. The first effect, as equity markets nowadays are updated 
almost instantly, when large trades take place can influence other investors to 
buy or sell a stock, giving power to large traders to influence markets by merely 
putting a large order in place. Moreover, the second effect results from a trade 
large enough to surpass market maker willingness to trade, impacting the quoted 
price. For example, imagine a significant enough trade made by a sizeable 
institutional investor willing to buy a stock at $100, when a stock is quoting at 
$90. Probably, the stock will tend to $100 (Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992). 
While theoretically simple, the price impact is hugely problematic when it 
comes to measuring because the price movement without the considering the 
order placement to the market is not observable.  
Market impact measures are particularly relevant in the literature on block 
trades – usually considered to be above 10,000 shares or $200,000. For example, 
SUN & IBIKUNLE (2017) using high-frequency data from London Stock 
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Exchange (LSE), they found that the price impact of block trades is stronger 
during the first hour of trading.  
2.1.2.4 Opportunity Costs 
For last, we present the opportunity costs. Representing the most challenging 
measure of implicit trading costs because its assessment involves information 
regarding the exact moment that the trader decides to execute an order. The 
opportunity trading costs symbolize the costs of missed trades, more precisely 
lost in value resulting from the time between trade decision and execution. For 
instance, consider a trader that wants to execute a buy order in period 𝑡, since he 
believe that the stock price will go upwards, but he cannot fulfill its order. The 
cost of this missing trade can be measured by the difference between the price in 
period 𝑡, and the price in period 𝑡 + 1, resulting in a lost of value regarding this 
trade.  
Three primary reasons drive these type of costs. First, an order can only be 
partially fulfilled or not fulfilled at all. Second, the price at which a trader desire 
to trade in 𝑡, can differ from the time at which the order is fulfilled 𝑡 + 1.  
D’Hondt & Giraud (2008), show that three different opportunity costs can 
drive the time difference between the trade decision and the execution. 
Operational opportunity costs, for instance, the time required for financial 
intermediaries assess the best trading venue to where route the investor’s order. 
Market timing costs, for example, if an order is large enough, sometimes the 
financial intermediary needs to divide the order into small orders to minimize 
market impact, increasing the execution time. Finally, missed trade opportunity 
costs, represented in the first example, where the trader will have a loss in value 
since he could not fulfill the order, or could only fulfill it partially. 
Several studies, e.g., (Bertimas, Lo, & Hummel, 1999; Brogaard et al., 2014; 
D’Hondt & Giraud, 2008; George et al., 1991; Hu, 2009; Keim & Madhavan, 1998) 
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used the described approaches during this subchapter to measure implicit 
trading costs. Verifying that when executing an order it is imperative to consider 
all of them. 
2.2 Financial Demand Models 
To understand the applied model in this research, first, we need to 
comprehend that trading venues provide different trading services. Hence, we 
can view trading venues as differentiated products, in competition with each 
other throughout its basket of characteristics (Ribeiro, 2010). For example, if we 
remind the ways that a financial intermediary can route its orders, the Electronic 
Communication Networks were better when it comes to executing limit orders 
since these kinds of networks can match order much faster than any other trading 
venue. Thus, in this subchapter, we will focus on the literature in financial 
demand models applied to differentiated products. 
2.2.1 Demand Models for Differentiated Products 
The literature regarding trading demand models is scarce. Hence, in this 
subchapter, we will focus on the existing literature, directly and indirectly, 
connected to trading demand models. Presenting a quick overview of the 
literature on differentiated product models applied to financial systems as a 
whole.  
Glaser, Rahman, Smith, & Chan(2013), using a panel data across seventy 
countries and seven years regarding the Microfinance Industry and applying a 
Bertrand model with a differentiated product, found that the increase in the 
number of Microfinance Institutions led to a remarkable increase in costumers’ 
welfare. 
Hortaçsu & Syverson (2004), using a multinomial logit model to modeling the 
demand for mutual funds trading S&P 500 stocks. Found that regardless of 
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financial homogeneousness in what concerns this type of funds, still exists 
dispersion concerning the level of the fees charged by each fund, indicating that 
the fees charged are essential when it comes to mutual fund investors, but are not 
the only variable taken into consideration by investors. 
Dick (2008), considering the U.S. bank branches as differentiated products, 
estimates a demand model using a nested logit model for commercial bank 
branch deposit services to evaluate the effects of the U.S. branching deregulation 
in the 1990s on depositors. Founding that the deposit rates and account fees are 
the primary drivers regarding this deposit decision and that depositors are 
favorable to the geographic expansion, resulting in a small upsurge in the welfare 
during the period analyzed. 
Molnar, Nagy, & Horvath(2007), using a multinomial logit model and data on 
Hungarian commercial banks, estimate a demand model for deposit and loan 
services to study the market dominance in the Hungarian household credit and 
deposit markets. Founding that in the used sample period the competition in the 
Hungarian banking sector was low, resulting in high price-cost margins. 
Ribeiro(2010), examine market dominance and barriers to competition 
regarding financial trading venues using a discrete-choice multinomial random-
coefficient logit demand model. Founding that financial intermediaries have a 
tendency to value liquidity more than total fees when dealing with the order 
execution process. 
To understand the theoretical model applied, first of all, we will need to retain 
from this subchapter that financial intermediaries have to choose to which 
trading venue to execute the investor’s order and that these trading venues differ 
from each other, competing through their varies characteristics. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Model and Econometric Strategy 
3. Theoretical Model and Econometric Strategy 
As we have seen before, trading venues provide different trading services, and 
the financial intermediary will have to choose the one best serves its interests. In 
this line, we can interpret the product offered by each trading venues as a product 
based on its differentiated basket of characteristics.  
In this chapter, will be presented the theoretical demand model applied in our 
analysis as well as the econometric strategy used to analyze market dominance. 
3.1 Theoretical Demand Model 
When estimating a demand model for equity markets, different trading 
venues have different products which mean that we will have a dimensionality 
issue – with a large number of trading venues becomes unbearable to estimate 
the demand for each trading venue. 
To deal with this issue, as other authors have done such as Dick (2008), 
Hortaçsu & Syverson(2004) and Ribeiro (2010), we use a multinomial logit model, 
becoming relevant only differences between characteristics of the differentiated 
product and not the number of trading venues. 
For simplicity we will assume that in what concerns financial intermediaries, 
these agents will always choose the trading venue that maximizes investors’ 
utility – financial intermediaries are obligated by law to give each investor the 
best possible order execution. 
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This utility is dependent on two key factors. Intermediary characteristics, such 
as the payment for order flow (Battalio & Holden, 2001), and trading venues 
characteristics, such as the spreads or the execution time of a particular order 
(Ribeiro, 2010). Moreover, since financial intermediaries are the ones that choose 
each trading venue to route the investors’ orders, we assume that the utility 
function to investors equals the utility function to the chosen financial 
intermediary. 
According to Berry(1994), this utility function splits into two distinct parts: the 
first part regarding specific features of trading venues, and the second one 
concerning specific characteristics of the financial intermediaries in charge to 
route investors’ orders. 
The first part known as the specific features of the trading venue, which 
captures an average shared utility to all financial intermediaries, according to 
(Berry, 1994), is given by the following formula: 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡 = 𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡  (1), where 
𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡  represents the observable characteristics vector of sending an order to a 
trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, to execute an order on stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇 , such as effective spread; and 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡  represents the unobservable 
characteristics of sending an order to a trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, to buy/sell a 
stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, such as explicit trading cost in our case. 
The second part concerning specific characteristics of the financial 
intermediaries in charge to route investors’ orders, or in mathematical language, 
the individual deviation of each intermediary from the mean (1), is given by, 
𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡  (2),  which can be read as the specific financial intermediaries characteristics 
to route investors’ orders to a trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, to execute an order on 
stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, by a financial intermediary 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, for 
example the commission received to route trades to some trading venues. 
Thus, from (1) and (2), we can extract that the following expression gives the 
individual utility function for each intermediary: 
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𝑢𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡          (3). 
 
To fully understand order execution process in this model, i.e., financial 
intermediary’s options to where to execute the order, two concepts are essential 
and shall be distinguished.  
Once the order is received, the financial intermediary has a basket of trading 
venues to where to route its trade. For our model, to compute the utility function 
as we will see afterward, we will need to exclude at least one from this basket of 
options resulting in two options. The inside option – trading venues considered 
in our model; and the outside option – trading venues considered in our model 
only for comparability. 
In this line and since we are trying to compare between different trading 
venues, it is required to normalize the utility function, resulting in a normalized 
utility function for outside option, such that  𝛿0𝑎𝑡 = 0, which implies a utility 
function 𝑢0𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡 (4), meaning that the utility function for the outside option 
depends only on the specific characteristics of the financial intermediary, all else 
equal. 
 
 
 
 
The specific characteristics of the financial intermediary leading to the choice 
of a particular trading venue be defined by: 
 
𝐴𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡) = {𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡|𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡 > 𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘𝑎𝑖𝑡, ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗}         (5), 
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where 𝐴𝑗𝑎𝑡  represents financial intermediaries choices to where to route 
investors’ orders to a trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, to execute an order on stock 𝑎 =
1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇; and 𝜹𝑎𝑡 = (𝛿0𝑎𝑡, 𝛿1𝑎𝑡, … , 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡)
′
 represents the vector 
of the average utilities associated with all platform 𝑗 = 0, … , 𝐽, to execute an order 
on stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.  
Given the latter equation, we can extract that the observed aggregate market 
share, 𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡 of a given trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, a stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇, will be given by the probability of vector 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡 be inside the region 𝐴𝑗𝑎𝑡: 
 
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹) = ∫ 𝑑𝑃(𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡)
𝐴𝑗𝑎𝑡
          (6), 
 
where 𝜀𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑡, the specific financial intermediaries characteristics to route investors’ 
orders to a trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, to execute an order on stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, by 
a financial intermediary 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, which in consonance 
with Berry (1994), we considered to be independent and identically distributed 
(i.i.d.) of type I, extreme value distribution, making the non-linear aggregate 
market share of a given trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘, … , 𝐽, on a stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in 
period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, be given as: 
 
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡) =
𝑒(𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡)
𝑒(𝛿0𝑎𝑡) + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
=
𝑒(𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡)
1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
          (7), 
 
Moreover, the demand elasticities associated with the observable 
characteristics vector, 𝑿𝜌𝑗𝑎𝑡, to a given financial intermediary characteristic 𝜌 =
1, … , Ρ, in trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, on a stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 
given by: 
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𝜂𝑗𝑘𝑎𝑡 =
𝜕𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝜕𝑋𝜌𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑋𝜌𝑗𝑎𝑡
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 {
𝛽𝜌 𝑋𝜌𝑗𝑎𝑡 (1 − 𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡)         𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑘
−𝛽𝜌 𝑋𝜌𝑗𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
          (8). 
 
3.2 Econometric Strategy 
From the previous subchapter, we could see that the aggregate market share 
is a non-linear equation, and is dependent on the observable and unobservable 
characteristics of the existing trading venues in the market, making it 
complicated to estimate. Berry(1994), however, shows that it is possible to 
perform an estimation of this equation parameters using linear methods. Next, 
we will present the transformation process suggested, and that we used as well 
as a resource to estimate these parameters. 
Consider 𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡
∗  as the observed market share to trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, on a 
stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, and 𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡 the market share resulting from 
the model to trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 , on a stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴 , in period 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇. Also consider 𝜹𝑎𝑡 as the vector of the average utilities to stock 𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴, 
in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, such that, the estimated market shares by the model equal 
the observed market shares: 
 
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡) = 𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡 
∗           (9), 
 
Since 𝜹𝑎𝑡 = (𝛿0𝑎𝑡, 𝛿1𝑎𝑡, … , 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡)
′
 with 𝛿0𝑎𝑡 = 0, we are dealing with an equation 
system with 𝐽 equations and 𝐽 unknown variables. Supposing that to all inside 
options equations 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, exists a correlation between the estimated market 
shares and the observed market shares, we can also conclude that the same can 
be applied to the outside option, resulting in: 
 
𝑠0𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡) = 𝑆0𝑎𝑡 
∗           (10), 
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Similar rational can be applied to the market share equation (7), from the 
previous subchapter, so that the market share of the outside option will be given 
by:  
 
𝑠0𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡) =
𝑒(𝛿0𝑎𝑡)
1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
=
1
1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
          (11), 
 
By dividing both equations previously defined, (7) by (11), 
 
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
𝑠0𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
=
𝑒(𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡)
1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
1
1 + ∑ 𝑒(𝛿𝑘𝑎𝑡)𝐽𝑘=1
=  𝑒𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡           (12), 
 
 
Then, applying the logarithm to both sides, we obtain that: 
 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
𝑠0𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡) = 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡           (13), 
 
Finally, as 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑡 = 𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡 (1), we can compute this equation as follow: 
 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑠𝑗𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
𝑠0𝑎𝑡(𝜹𝑎𝑡)
) =  𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡 
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆0𝑎𝑡 
∗ ) = 𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡𝜷 + 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡          (14) 
 
As a result, we have a linear model, where our dependent variable will be 
given by 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑗𝑎𝑡 
∗ ) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆0𝑎𝑡 
∗ ), and represents the utility to execute the order into 
trading venue  𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽 , of stock  𝑎 = 1, … , 𝐴 , in period  𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  when 
compared to the outside option, and our explanatory variables will be given by 
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the observed characteristic vector 𝑿𝑗𝑎𝑡 about trading venue 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽, stock 𝑎 =
1, … , 𝐴, in period 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇,  and our unknown/unobserved variables will be in 
the error term 𝜉𝑗𝑎𝑡. 
Lastly, since the data provided by trading venues regarding order execution, 
have limitations, not capturing all the relevant variables to our demand model, 
we used dummy variables as suggested in (Nevo, 2000). In our case, these 
variables can capture steady characteristics across trading venues, stocks or 
period, assuring that non-observable variables regarding order execution 
decision are in this dummies, reducing possible endogeneity issues.  
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Analysis 
4. Empirical Analysis 
After a full scope, regarding order execution in the U.S. and literature 
regarding implicit costs of trading as well as demand models for differentiated 
products. In the chapter, we present the data description used to estimate the 
theoretical demand model along with the summary statistics and preliminary 
analysis, concluding with the results from estimation and price elasticities. 
4.1 Data Description 
Under the Rule 605 of the Reg NMS (formerly Rule 11Ac1-5), trading venues 
operating in the U.S. must make available specific order execution information 
monthly, facilitating the uniform public disclosure of order execution 
information by all market centers (https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-
publications/investorpubsexqualityhtm.html).  
We compiled this data across 13 exchanges and 59 alternative trading systems 
(ATSs) or over-the-counter (OTCs), FINRA members for the period between 
September 2016 and December 2017, resulting in a panel database. Table 3 
provides us the exchanges integrated into this database. Note that we aggregated 
all the 59 ATSs/OTCs in FINRA. 
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Table 3 –  Exchanges 
BYX Equities IEX NASDAQ NYSE 
BZX Equities CHX NASDAQ BX NYSE American 
EDGA Equities NSX NASDAQ PSX NYSE Arca 
EDGX Equities FINRA     
 
This panel database provides us records about a set of execution-quality 
measures by trading venue, stock, period, order size, and order type, becoming 
enormous. To deal with this issue, in this thesis, we will only examine market 
orders and marketable limit orders for S&P 500 stocks during this period, 
accounting for 512 stocks. Moreover, we aggregated the estimation by orders 
size, considering small size orders, orders below 2000 shares, and large size 
orders, orders equal or above 2000 shares. Resulting in a much smaller sample 
(43,417 observations). 
4.2 Model Variables  
As already mentioned in the literature review, the financial intermediaries, 
when choosing the trading venue to place their orders, take into account several 
variables, such as the effective spread and the execution speed of execution of the 
financial. Since our data have limitations regarding the type of execution-quality 
measures, we had to adapt some of the existing variables in the data to estimate 
the demand model better. Resulting in three explanatory variables: 
 
 The Avegare Effective Spread; 
 
 The Weighted Average of Execution Time; 
 
 The Percentage of Trades with Price Improvement. 
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The average effective spread measures the total cost in dollars of executing an 
order. This measure computed by comparing the execution price of an order with 
the National Best Bid & Offer (NBBO) midpoint at the time the order is received: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝐵𝑢𝑦−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡) ∗ 2 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 = (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡) ∗ 2 
 
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡  denotes the NBBO quoted bid-ask spread midpoint in 
period 𝑡, and 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  the actual price at which the order was fulfilled in 
period 𝑡. 
The weighted average of execution time is a variable adapted by us since such 
measure does not exist in the data. As the name indicates, respects to the average 
time to an order to be executed, after the placement to execute by the financial 
intermediary. Computed the by following formula: 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 =
(𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸0𝑠−9𝑠 × 4,5) + (𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸10𝑠−29𝑠 × 19,5) + (𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸30𝑠−59𝑠 × 44,5) +
+ (𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸60𝑠−299𝑠 × 179,5) + (𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸5𝑚−30𝑚 × 1050)
𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸
 
 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸0𝑠−9𝑠 denotes the cumulative covered orders executed between 0 
and 9 seconds, 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸10𝑠−29𝑠 represents the cumulative covered orders executed 
between 10 and 29 seconds, 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸30𝑠−59𝑠 indicates the cumulative covered orders 
executed between 30 and 59 seconds,  𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸60𝑠−299𝑠  denotes the cumulative 
covered orders executed between 60 and 299 seconds,  𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸5𝑚−30𝑚 represents 
the cumulative covered orders executed between 5 and 30 minutes. For last, 
𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑂𝐸  represents the total of all these cumulative covered orders, and the 
numbers represent the average in seconds of the that they are multiplying. 
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The percentage of trades with price improvement, %𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼, is also a measure 
adopted by us representing the percentage of trades that were fulfilled at 
higher/lower bid/ask price, than the quoted price at the time the order placed. 
Since our data give us the number cumulative covered orders executed with price 
improvement, and the total number of cumulative covered orders executed, we 
only need to divide the first by the second. 
Regarding the market share (our dependent variable in the model), to compute 
this variable was necessary to define two new variables. One representing the 
total cumulative covered orders by platform, stock, and period, and another 
denoting the total cumulative covered orders only by stock and period. Once 
these two variables were defined, we could obtain the market share by dividing 
the first former by the latter. 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
Because financial intermediaries need to take in consideration the type and 
size of the order when deciding the trading venue to which they should route the 
order, we have divided the sample into four main types of orders. Type I - Market 
orders made by small investors, representing orders with a small size (<2,000 
shares) to execute at the current market price. Type II - Market orders made by 
large investors, denoting orders with large size (=>2,000 shares) to execute at the 
current market price. Type III - Marketable limit order made by small investors, 
representing orders with a small size (<2,000 shares) to execute only if the stock 
reaches a certain price. Finally, Type IV - marketable limit order made by large 
investors, representing orders with a large size (=>2,000 shares) to execute only if 
the stock reaches a certain price.  
Moreover, to mitigate risks regarding orders at abnormal prices, i.e., orders 
that would never fulfill we do not take into account in our model cancel orders. 
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Table 4 – Summary Statistics of Market Orders / Small Investors (I) * 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.049740 0.023050 0.100141 -0.063450 4.031900 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 4.840417 4.500000 1.503787 4.500000 57.582100 
%𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼 0.284777 0.174070 0.266631 0.000000 1.000000 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 0.231815 0.007522 0.364754 0.000011 0.465284 
* The statistics presented are computed across 7,304 observations. 
 
Table 4 presents statistics for the type I orders. From this measures we can 
observe the effective spread measured in dollars, was on average $0.05, the 
surpassing the double of the median value of $0.02, and having a standard 
deviation of $0.10. The weighted average execution time measured in seconds, 
was on average 4.84 seconds, outstanding the median value by 0,34 seconds, 
meaning that there were more orders executed in less time. The mean percentage 
of orders with price improvement measured was considerably higher that is 
median, 28.47%, and 17.41%, respectively. Meaning that, as expected, there exist 
more orders without price improvement. Regarding the market share, we can see 
that the market share for Type I orders seem to be a concentrated market, with 
trading venues counting for the majority of the market share since the average is 
much larger than the median, 23.18%, and 0.01%, respectively.  
Note that since we only consider orders executed orders, the minimum value 
of the weighted average execution time is 4.5, i.e., the minimum that this variable 
can take. 
 
Table 5 – Summary Statistics of Market Orders / Large Investors (II) * 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.046193 0.019811 0.102209 -0.477643 2.249100 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 4.741365 4.500000 3.069963 4.500000 147.535400 
%𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼 0.287779 0.261500 0.272975 0.000000 1.000000 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 0.366098 0.024814 0.403393 0.000017 0.491305 
* The statistics presented are computed across 4,381 observations. 
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Table 5 presents statistics for the type II orders. From this measures, we can 
observe the effective spread measured in dollars, behave in the same way as Type 
I orders, on average $0.05, the surpassing the double of the median value of $0.02, 
and having a standard deviation of $0.10. Regarding the weighted average 
execution time measured in seconds, was on average 4.84 seconds, also 
remaining higher than the median value but by 0,24 seconds, meaning that there 
were more orders executed in less time. The mean percentage of orders with price 
improvement measured was slightly higher that is median, 28.77%, and 26.15%, 
respectively. Lastly, concerning the market share, in Type II orders we can see 
that the market share orders seem to be also a concentrated market, with trading 
venues counting for the majority of the market share since the average market 
share is much larger than the median, 36.61%, and 0.03%, respectively.  
Table 6 – Summary Statistics of Limit Orders / Small Investors (III) * 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.043106 0.015200 0.130140 -0.006250 6,264200 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 4.826642 4.508146 1.499632 4.500000 92.000000 
%𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼 0.023134 0.014615 0.032062 0.000000 0.4668683 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 0.067358 0.036308 0.093888 0.000001 0.5583832 
* The statistics presented are computed across 17,301 observations. 
 
Table 6 presents statistics for the type III orders. When it comes to marketable 
limit orders, the trading seems to be different from the market orders. We can 
observe the effective spread measured in dollars, behave in the same way as Type 
I and II orders, on average $0.04, the greater than the median value of $0.02, and 
having a standard deviation of $0.13. Regarding the weighted average execution 
time measured in seconds, was on average 4.83 seconds, also remaining higher 
than the median value by 0,31 seconds, meaning that there were more orders 
executed in less time. The mean as well as the median of the percentage of orders 
with price improvement, though, decreases significantly when compared to 
market order with values of 2.31%, and 1.46%, respectively. Probably driven by 
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the order type, since it only is executed if reaches a certain price, lowering the 
probability of price improvement orders. Moreover, concerning the market share 
in Type III orders, also the behavior in this market it is very different than in Type 
I and II. We can see from the market share that this is probably a fragmented 
market, with a large number of trading venues counting for the majority of the 
market share since the average market share is relatively low and slightly higher 
the median, 6.74%, and 3.63%, respectively.  
Table 7 – Summary Statistics of Limit Orders / Large Investors (IV) * 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 0.047732 0.016250 0.018300 -0.036000 10.830000 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 8.686076 4.500000 17.555780 4.500000 427.845200 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 0.011256 0.005118 0.025002 0.000000 1.000000 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 0.093632 0.028709 0.165291 0.000003 0.963100 
* The statistics presented are computed across 14,431 observations. 
 
Table 7 presents statistics for the type IV orders. When it comes to marketable 
limit orders within large orders, the trading seems to be similar to marketable 
limit orders for small orders. We observe that the effective spread measured in 
dollars, behave in the same way as Type I, II and III orders, on average $0.05, the 
greater than the median value of $0.02, and having a standard deviation a little 
higher than in the other types of $0.18. Regarding the weighted average execution 
time measured in seconds, also a little higher than in the order types, on average 
8.69 seconds, remaining higher than the median value 3,19 seconds, meaning that 
there were more orders executed in less time. The mean and median percentage 
of orders with price improvement also decreases significantly when compared to 
market order with values of 1.13%, and 0.01%, respectively. Finally, the market 
share, also the behaves in this market it is very different than in Type I and II. We 
observe that from this market share this is probably a fragmented market, with a 
large number of trading venues counting for the majority of the market share 
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since the average market share is relatively low and slightly higher the median, 
9.36%, and 2.87%, respectively.  
4.4 Estimation and Price Elasticities Results 
As we have seen before during the theoretical model chapter, we needed to 
create an outside option. To create the outside option we choose Bats Platforms 
as this option. Remain nine exchanges and FINRA, as inside options.  
The next table presents the estimation coefficients as well as there level of 
significance for all the order’s type. Type I and II representing market orders for 
small and large investors, respectively. Type III and IV representing marketable 
limit orders for small and large investors, correspondingly.  
Table 8 – Estimation Results * 
 Specifications 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
-0.330507*** 
(0.090432) 
-0.278966** 
(0.155308) 
0.335263*** 
(0.107916) 
0.351561*** 
(0.096228) 
ln (𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇) 
0.026764 
(0.051045) 
0.080902 
(0.087970) 
-0.226206*** 
(0.058368) 
0.011972 
(0.007297) 
%𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼 
0.124809*** 
(0.044512) 
0.362875*** 
(0.093810) 
1.609550*** 
(0.162943) 
-0.018422 
(0.230126) 
     
R-Squared 35.89 16.07 15.87 14.71 
Overall F-Test 194.23*** 39.91*** 94.92*** 29.71*** 
* All specifications include a constant term and dummy variables respect date and 
participant. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by security in parenthesis. 
*** denotes p-values <0.01, ** denotes p-values <0.05, and * denotes p-values <0.10. 
 
By analyzing the specifications coefficients, we can state that across all the 
specifications the effective spread is significant at 1% level. However, contrary 
what we would expect, in the specifications III and IV, marketable limit orders, 
there is a positive relationship between the effective spread and the utility. 
Implying that as effective spread increase, the utility to execute orders in this 
trading venues also increase. We could not find research on this subject; however, 
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we can speculate that this may be caused by the payments for the order flow, 
since these payments incentivize financial intermediaries to trade in some 
trading venues, even though, the effective spread is higher than in other trading 
venues. Another explanation to this could be the fact that when dealing with 
marketable limit orders, financial intermediaries may choose the one that fastest 
matches its order to mitigate costs of missed trades.  
Moreover, we can infer the only model where the weighted average execution 
time variable is significant at 1% level is on the model III, marketable limit order 
by small investors. This negative coefficient means that has execution time 
increases utility to route the order to these trading venues decreases. 
Corroborating the last statement regarding mitigating the costs of missed trades.  
Finally, as expected, the percentage of the orders with price improvements has 
a positive and significant at 1% level relationships in three out of four models. 
Implying that as the number of orders with price improvements increase, the 
utility to send orders to these trading venues increase as well. 
In what concerns the demand price elasticities, however, the scenario is 
different. From the next table we can extract that regarding the implicit trading 
costs variables considered in our model, although, some significant, we can see 
that still exists market dominance since all the elasticities derived from our model 
are inelastic. 
 
Table 9 – Demand Elasticity Estimation by Variable 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 -0.007561*** -0.005390** 0.004911*** 0.005549*** 
𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑇 0.021733 0.064550 -0.178416*** 0.009514 
%𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐼 0.021562*** 0.092537*** 0.022669*** -0.000092 
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Chapter 5 
5. Conclusion 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), driven by numerous studies 
regarding market competition and economic efficiency, recognizing these two 
variables as having a positive correlation (Casu & Girardone, 2009; Porter, 1990),  
started to implement policies against market dominance. On August 29th, 2005, 
the Regulation National Markets System (Reg NMS) was released to harmonize 
regulation for equity trading services within the U.S., increasing competition and 
consumer protection in the trading industry services. 
This research attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of Reg NMS regarding 
trading venues competition using a multinomial logit demand model for 
differentiated products with dummy variables to capture a non-observable 
variable. 
After estimating the demand for the trading venues in the U.S. and analyzing 
its variables price elasticities (in our model we only considered implicit trading 
costs due to lack of data), from September 2016 to December 2016. Our findings 
suggest that, even though, implicit trading costs, are essential to estimate the 
trading demand still exists market dominance in the U.S. trading venues, 
resulting in unusually inelastic price elasticities. Further studies are required to 
understand the reason for such inelastic elasticities. 
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